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ACCRUED DIVIDENDS 
ACCRUED DIVIDENDS ON CUMULATIVE PREFERRED 
STOCKS: THE LEGAL DOCTRINE 
T HE adjustment of accrued dividends on cumulative preferred stock is an absorbing problem both in terms of legal doctrine 
and practical implications. The problem is essentially dynamic 
and controversial, calling for the exercise of careful judgments on 
the basis of public policy. On the one hand, the promotion of 
healthy corporate enterprise demands that some solution be 
reached to free capital structures from what Mr. Justice Douglas 
has aptly characterized as " '!- morass of accumulated unpaid divi-
dends." 1 On the other hand, to borrow the words of Professor 
Dodd, the present system of adjusting accrued dividends is giving 
" to property rights a fluidity and an indefiniteness quite foreign to. 
anything which existed in the corporation law of a century or even 
a half-century ago." 2 
The legal literature which within recent years has developed 
around the subject of dividend arrearages and related aspects of 
shareholders' rights is so extensive that a word of explanation is in 
order to justify adding another article to the many already in print. 
It is not the purpose of this article to examine the accrued dividend 
problem insofar as it reveals in cross-section the changing nature 
of our corporate economy. Various writers have effectively dem-
onstrated how accrued dividend adjustments, along with other 
changes in shareholders' rights, reflect the separation of corporate 
ownership from control, the conflicts arising between corporate 
managements and preferred shareholders as a class, and the con-
sequent need for legislative and other types of controls.3 Instead, 
1 DouGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE (1940) 134. This comment was directed 
specifically to the existence in 1938 of some $432,ooo,ooo of arrears on preferred 
stocks of public utility companies. 
2 Dodd, The Modern Corporation, Private Property, and Recent Federal Legis-
lation (1941) 54 HARv. L. REv. 917, 923. For a recent judicial recognition of this 
conflict, see Davison v. Parke, Austin & Lipscomb, Inc., 285 N. Y. soo, 5o6, 
35 N. E.(2d) 618, 621 (1941). 
s The outstanding contributions along these lines are BERLE & MEANs, THE 
MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) 267-70 and passim, andRE-
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
the present objective is to define and clarify the applicable legal
doctrine as it has developed in the cases. In this last respect the
literature is inadequate, not because doctrinal analysis has been
neglected, but rather because a faulty method of approach has
tended to produce confused treatment.
One reason for this ineffectual analysis on the doctrinal level
stems from the fact that it was not until about 1935 that the ac-
crued dividend problem became sufficiently important to warrant
treatment in its own right. While certain of the general surveys of
charter amendments appearing prior to that date do represent defi-
nite contributions,4 they are unsatisfactory for present-day pur-
poses because of their over-concern with constitutional questions
revolving about the exercise of the reserve power by state legisla-
tures.' The more recent articles and comments, devoted especially
to dividend arrearages, are subject to more specific criticism.
Written at a time when the applicable law was seemingly in a state
of flux,6 they frequently contain generalizations of doubtful valid-
ity. Often they have attempted to cover too much territory,
PORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON T STUDY AND INVESTIGA-
TION OF THE WORE, AcrvITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND
REORGANIZATION COMITTEES,.PART VII (1938) 464-67, 501-25, 549-56, and passim
(hereinafter cited as SEC PEP. ON REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES). To these should
be added the recent article by Dodd, The Modern Corporation, Private Property,
and Recent Federal Legislation (1941) 54 HARv. L. REv. 917. See also Notes (1938)
33 ILL. L. REv. 212, (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 985, 999.
4 Cades, Constitutional and Equitable Limitations on the Power of the Majority
to Amend Charters (1928) 77 U. oF PA. L. REv. 256; Curran, Minority Stockholders
and the Amendment of Corporate Charters (1934) 32 MICH. L. REv. 743; Dodd,
Amendment of Corporate Articles under the New Ohio General Corporation Act
(1930) 4 U. oF CIN. L. REv. 129 (not confined to the Ohio situation), Dissenting
Stockholders and Amendments to Corporate Charters (1927) 75 U. OF PA. L. RV.
585, 723.
5 Most of the cases since 1935 have been concerned with the proper construc-
tion of existing corporation statutes rather than with the applicability of new stat-
utes conferring additional power to deal with accrued dividends. It is interesting
to note that this shift in emphasis was predicted by Dodd in 1927. Dissenting Stock-
holders and Amendments to Corporate Charters, 75 U. or PA. L. REv. 723, 744.
With the enactment of new statutes by Ohio and Virginia, however, the reserve
power question may again become paramount. See note 57 infra.
6 Recent cases in Delaware in particular indicate that there the state of flux in
many respects was more apparent than real. However, the decision which pointed
this out in Delaware, Havender v. Federal United Corp., ii A.(2d) 33X (Del. Sup.
Ct. 1940), was so unexpected that no criticism can be made for the feeling that the
law was undergoing constant change.
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whether by touching upon every aspect of the problem,7 or by dis-
cussing decisions from seven or more states, each with somewhat
different statutory provisions.' As a consequence there is still
room for careful study of the fundamental corporate theory under-
lying the entire problem.'
Actually, so far as legal doctrine is concerned, there are only two
issues at stake in accrued dividend adjustments. There is first the
existence of corporate power to carry out the adjustment in a par-
ticular way, or, expressed differently, whether the -changes are
permissible within the terms of the preferred stock contract. Sec-
ondly, there is the extent to which the courts will require an adjust-
ment to be fair and equitable, and the ascertainment of the criteria
of fairness which are to be applied."0 Here it is proposed to ex-
plore these two matters only insofar as they have been developed
7 For example, in almost every instance some space is devoted to public policy
considerations and often a program for reform is outlined. See Notes (94) 54
HARv. L. REV. 488, (1941) 39 MicH. L. REv. 1201, (1941) 89 U. or PA. L. REV. 789,
('937) 46 YALE L. J. 985. Or a particular discussion may lean heavily on analogies
to alterations in other rights of shareholders. See Notes (I94I) 89 U. oF PA. L. REv.
789, (1937) 23 VA. L. REv. 579. Other writers have introduced further matters such
as the status of accrued dividends in equity receiverships and bankruptcy reorganiza-
tions. See Note (i937) 4 U. oF Car. L. REv. 645.
8 E.g., Becht, The Power to Remove Accrued Dividends by Charter Amend-
ment (1940) 40 COL. L. REv. 633 (seven state statutes) ; Note (i941) 89 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 789 (eight state statutes). This same weakness necessarily permeates the
legal memorandum in SEC REp. ON REORGANIZATION CoLMITrEES, PART VII (1938)
464-610, and KEnrL, CORPORAx DIVIDENDS (1941) 21o-i8. Moreover, there are
often two distinct types of statutes involved such as charter amendment and merger
provisions, and also vital chronological differences may exist even within a single
state. 'Where the statutory complexities make the going too rough, the decision will
be relegated to a footnote or left to the recent case section. E.g., Kreicker v. Naylor
Pipe Co., 374 Ill. 364, 29 N. E.(2d) 502 (940), 8 U. or Cm. L. REv. 134.
9 In appraising the writings on accrued dividends adjustments since 1935, Note
(X941) 89 U. OF PA. L. REv. 789 is among the best, in spite of many faults. On the
doctrinal level, Note (1938) 12 U. or CIN. L. REv. 576 is very good, although it is
perhaps too purely "legalistic" and tends to ramble. Other worthwhile discussions
include: K.=, CORPORATE DIVIDENDS (1941) 210-18; Becht, The Power to Remove
Accrued Dividends by Charter Amendment (0940) 40 COL. L. REv. 633; Notes
(194) 54 HARV. L. REv. 488, (940) 25 CORN. L. Q. 431, (938) 33 ILL. L. REv. 212,
(1937) 4 U. oF CHI. L. REv. 645, (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 985. Individual case notes
are worthless for the most part.
10 This method of dealing with accrued dividend adjustments in 'a sense is a
return to the basic approach suggested by BERLE & MEANS, Tns MODERN CORPO-
RATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) 248: "In every case, corporate action must
be twice tested: first, by the technical rules having to do with the existence and
proper exercise of the power; second, by equitable rules. .. 2
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in the case law, and in the case law of only two states, Delaware and
New Jersey. In both, the applicable body of case law is relatively
mature. The Delaware doctrine has assumed for the time
being, at least, a definite pattern, while the New Jersey doctrine
has apparently progressed beyond that pattern into a second for-
mative period. An interesting contrast is thus afforded. By con-
fining the discussion to these two states, moreover, it is possible to
illustrate better the vital interplay between corporation statutes
and case law,
THE PREFERRED STOCK CONTRACT
The adjustment of accrued dividends on cumulative preferred
stock is essentially a problem of altering the preferred stock con-
tract. For that reason some preliminary consideration of this con-
tract is desirable, even at the risk of repeating much that is elemen-
tary. The starting point is of necessity the corporate charter, for
it is there that the preferred stock contract is normally found.11
In early American corporate history, "corporate charter" was
used rather narrowly to denote the special legislative enactment
by which a corporation was created. Today its meaning is much
broader and embraces not only the certificate or articles of in-
corporation, but also the general corporation statute of the state in
which a corporation is organized and, to the extent constitutionally
permissible, all subsequent amendments of that statute.1 2  To
adopt the traditional terminology, this corporate charter consti-
tutes a contract tripartite in nature, one contract being between the
corporation and the state, a second between the corporation and its
shareholders, and a third between the shareholders inter sese.
While all three contracts may be involved in the present situation,
it is the last two which are of primary importance.
Insofar as accrued dividends are concerned, the preferred stock
11 Under certain circumstances the provisions of the stock certificate, the by-
laws at the time of issuance of the stock, or the proceedings by which the stock was
created may also be pertinent. See Note (1938) 12 U. oi? CiN. L. REV. 576, 577;
Johnson v. Fuller, 36 F. Supp. 744, 747 (E. D. Pa. 1940), aff'd 121 F.(2d) 618
(C. C. A. 3d, 1941). For a critical discussion of the conception of the corporate
charter as a contract, see Dodd, Dissenting Stockholders and Amendments to Cor-
porate Charters (1927) 75 U. or PA. L. REv. 58g, 592.
12 Section 83 of the Delaware Corporation Law (DEL. REv. CODE (i935) § 211S)
specifically provides that the statutory provisions become part of the corporate
charter.
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contract is mainly concerned with defining the relation between
the common and preferred shareholders with respect to the division
of the profits of the enterprise." The language of various charters
varies somewhat, but there are surprisingly few differences of sub-
stance. A representative provision, stripped of its excess verbiage,
reads as follows:
The holders of the Preferred Stock shall be entitled to receive from the,
surplus and/or net profits of the corporation when and as declared by
the Board of Directors fixed cumulative dividends at the rate of four dol-
lars ($4) per share per annum payable quarterly on the first days of Jan-
uary, April, July, and October in each year and said fixed cumulative
dividends upon the Preferred Stock shall be paid or set apart before any
dividend shall be paid or set apart on the Common Stock.1
4
It is universally recognized in the case of both cumulative and
noncumulative preferred stocks that such a provision does not con-
fer on the preferred shareholder any right to receive his dividend
until it has been declared. The only right he has is one to receive
his dividend as a condition precedent to payment of a dividend
upon the common stock. Where cumulative preferred stock is in-
volved, no dividend may be paid on the common stock until not
pnly the current preferred dividend has been paid, but also all pre-
ferred dividends for past years. In other words, the right of cumu-
lative preferred stock as against the common stock is to a certain
number of dollars, the precise amount depending upon the number
of past failures to pay preferred dividends. To be more specific,
let us suppose a corporation was organized and began business on
January i, 1939, with common stock and $4 cumulative preferred
stock, the latter having the same provision as to dividends as that
set out above. If in December, 1941, no dividends had ever been
paid on the preferred stock, in order to pay a common dividend
13 Accrued dividends may also create a problem upon liquidation and again the
outcome is governed by the preferred stock contract. Cases illustrative of the prob-
lem include Garrett v. Edge Moor Iron Co., 194 Atl. iS (Del. Ch. 1937), aff'd sub
nor. Pennsylvania Co. for Insurances on Lives & Granting Annuities v. Cox, 199
Atl. 67I (Del. Sup. Ct. 1938); Penington v. Commonwealth Hotel Construction
Co., i7 Del. Ch. 394, I55 At. 514 (Sup. Ct. 1931); Lloyd v. Pennsylvania Electric
Vehicle Co., 75 N. J. Eq. 263, 72 Atl. i6 (i909). Powell v. Craddock-Terry Co.,
,75 Va. 146, 7 S. E.(2d) 143 (1940).
14 In substance this is the provision in Consolidated Film Industries, Inc. v.
Johnson, I97 At. 489 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1937), discussed infra pages 86-87.
1941]
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there must first be paid on the preferred $4 for 1941, and also $4
for 194o and $4 for I939, or $12 in all. This is so without regard to
the existence or non-existence of earnings or surplus for the years
194o and I939." It is this right to past dividends, normally called
accrued dividends or simply arrearages, which is the focal point of
any adjustment.
The precise nature of the preferred shareholder's right to ac-
crued dividends has been the subject of much unilluminating ju-
dicial discourse. The mere lapse of time, during which preferred
dividends are said to accrue, has been regarded as possessing some
magical significance. Of the many characterizations which have
been applied, " vested right "is the most popular, although " prop-
erty right," "substantial right," and "fixed, contractual right"
are also well established in the terminology. 6 Moreover, the cases
abound in cryptic language such as that describing accrued divi-
dends as having " the nature and character of a debt." 17 While
these terms and phrases were uttered in a sincere attempt at ex-
planation, actually they have proved to be misleading and decep-
tive. Even in their context, where constitutional issues usually
were involved, their value is somewhat dubious, and divorced from
context they have none at all. Too often they have been accepted
as substitutes for reason and analysis. The fundamental point
that never should be forgotten is that the right goes no deeper than
the particular preferred stock contract in question, and that the
principal task is to construe that contract in the light of the articles
of incorporation and the pertinent corporation statute.
Some conception of the nature of the right to accrued dividends
15 In Day v. United States Cast Iron Pipe & Foundry Co., 96 N. J. Eq. 736, 740,
126 Atl. 302, 304 (1924), this was made very dear: "The dividends upon cumula-
tive preferred stock have at all times and for all years past and present, until paid,
priority in payment over any and all unpaid dividends upon common stock, whether
the net earnings for any particular past or present year were or were not sufficient
to pay the stipulated cumulative dividends upon preferred stock for that year. .. 2
16 This terminology probably had its origin in Roberts v. Roberts-Wicks Co.,
X84 N. Y. 257, 77 N. E. 13 (i9o6). It came to full flower in the Delaware cases,
from which the various characterizations in the text have been lifted. Morris v.
American Public Utilities Co., 14 Del. Ch. 136, 122 AtI. 696 (Ch. 1923); Keller v.
Wilson & Co., 21 Del. Ch. 391, i9o At. I5 (Sup. Ct. 1936); Consolidated Film
Industries, Inc. v. Johnson, 197 At!. 489 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1937) ; Federal United Corp.
v. Havender, ii A.(2d) 331 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1940).
17 See Keller v. Wilson & Co., 21 Del. Ch. 391, 41 , 19o Atl. 15, 124 (Sup. Ct.
1936).
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can perhaps be gained by analyzing the sharp distinction the courts
have drawn between it and the right to future dividends, which,
in contrast to "vested," has been labeled "contingent," "ex-
pectant," and "defeasible." 11 This distinction has been the sub-
ject of criticism, purportedly on the functional ground that both
rights are to dividends in the future and consequently are identi-
cal." Returning to the hypothetical case, is there any difference
in December, 1941, between the right to $12 of arrearages and the
right to the $i quarterly dividend which will accrue on January i,
1942? Each is the right to receive at some future date a certain
number of dollars before any dividend, on that same future date or
immediately thereafter, can be paid on the common stock. From
this standpoint the passage of dividend dates is immaterial except
as it increases the amount in dollars to which the preferred stock is
entitled prior to payment of any common dividend."'
This analysis is defective,however, for there is a sound basis, also
functional, for the distinction. The right to past accrued dividends
is a present right and has a present-effectiveness which the right to
future dividends lacks. Thus, in December, 1941, the right to $12
of arrearages then and there blocks any common dividend until the
$12 is paid. Were there no such arrearages, a common dividend
could be paid, and the right of the preferred stock to $i on January
1, 1942, would be wholly irrelevant. Viewed in this light the right
to accrued dividends is one of substance possessing the quality of
immediate enforcibility against the common stock."'
Doubtless this very rationale underlies many of the decisions.
18 See Consolidated Film Industries, Inc. v. fohnson, 197 AtI. 489, 493 (Del. Sup.
Ct. 1937).
19 See Note (X937) 46 YALE L. J. 985, 987. This was also the view of the Ohio
State Bar Association Committee on Corporation Law, which proposed a specific
amendment made part of the Ohio statute in 1939 which is set forth in full note 57
infra. In a private communication received in April, 1940, from the chairman of
that committee, he stated, inter alia: "On principle there is no distinction between
the right to an accrued dividend and the right to a future preference, except that
through the lapse of time the right to accrued dividends can be stated in dollars."
An explanatory note to the same effect is to be found in Omo CODE ANN. (Throck-
morton, Supp. 1940) § 8623-14.
20 Similarly the number of dollars to which the preferred stock is entitled on
liquidation prior to the common stock is increased. But that right also is in futuro
and may never become enforcible.
21 Cf. Penington v. Commonwealth Hotel Construction Co., i7 Del. Ch. 394,
x55 AUt. 524 (Sup. Ct. 1931) ; Garrett v. Edge Moor Iron Co., 194 At. i5 (Del. Ch.
1941]
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In addition there are other and related explanations for the tend-
ency to single out accrued dividends as entitled to special protec-
tion. Historically, preferred stock in America has at least some
kinship to debt securities, such as mortgage bonds, as well as to
equity securities as represented by stock. Consequently some
tendency can be found to treat accrued dividends somewhat like
accrued interest. Furthermore, this special protection of accrued
dividends has a psychological basis, for clearly both the preferred
stock investor and the corporate management feel, logically or not,
that when a preferred dividend date passes without payment, some-
thing has happened. It is this which may lead courts to say that
just as the cumulative feature may have been an inducement to
purchase preferred stock, so also upon the passing of a dividend it
may be an inducement to retain that stock.22
The practical objective in any adjustment of dividend arrearages
is the avoidance of paying their full amount in cash. While com-
mentators speak of the "cancellation" or "elimination " of ac-
crued dividends, such descriptions are not always accurate. In
many instances "adjustment" is a better label, because the pre-
ferred shareholder purportedly receives at least a partial quid pro
quo for his arrearages. He may receive common stock, additional
preferred or new prior preferred, interest-bearing certificates, or
various combinations of these with perhaps a little cash included.
The face amount of what he receives may or may not be equal to
the amount of his dividend arrearages, and the immediately realiz-
able value is invariably much less. Various methods have been
employed to carry out such adjustments, but in the main they fall
into one of three classifications: the direct charter amendment, the
merger or consolidation, and the indirect charter amendment.2 3
1937), aff'd sub nom. Pennsylvania Co. for Insurances on Lives & Granting Annui-
ties v. Cox, 199 AtI. 671 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1938). But cf. dissenting opinion of judge
L. Hand in Harr v. Pioneer Mechanical Corp., 65 F.(2d) 332, 336 (C. C. A. 2d,
1933).
22 See Keller v. Wilson & Co., 21 Del. Ch. 391, 411, i9o Atl. 115, 124 (Sup. Ct.
1936).-
22 The best exposition of these three techniques is in Note, Elimination of Ac-
crued Dividends in Corporate Reconstruction (1941) 89 U. oF PA. L. Rv. 789.
See also Becht, The Powver to Remove Accrued Dividends by Charter Amendment
(1940) 40 COL. L. REV. 633; Notes (194I) 54 HAvu. L. REV. 488, (i941) 39 MICH.
L. REV. i2oi, (1937) 4 U. ors CnI. L. REv. 645.
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While all three are substantially similar in basic theory and any
differences are principally in form, these terms afford a convenient
shorthand expression for particular procedures, and they will be
so used throughout this article. The precise technique involved in
each will be set forth fully in connection with the Delaware cases.
Here it should be noted only that the direct charter amendment
and merger or consolidation methods operate directly to convert
accrued dividends into some other type of security or occasionally
to eliminate them entirely, while the indirect charter amendment
method leaves the arrearages in existence but subordinates them to
payment of dividends on some new class of shares. In general, the
first two methods are said to be compulsory, while the third is
optional.24
The principal obstacle to be overcome, regardless of the method
employed, is the objection of dissenting preferred shareholders.
At one time, of course, there was embedded in American corpora-
tion law a doctrine of unanimous consent. In origin a carry-over
from partnership law, this doctrine laid down the inflexible re-
quirement that the contracts between the corporation and its share-
holders and between the shareholders inter sese could not be
changed without ioo% shareholder consent, except in certain non-
fundamental respects. 5 As this rule began to stultify corporate
progress, it was modified by making the shareholders' contracts,
upon their inception, subject to alteration by less than ioo% of the
shareholders. Thus today charter amendments in Delaware may
be carried out upon majority approval, mergers upon two-thirds
approval. 6 These provisions are found in the corporation statute
and as such become part of the corporate charter. As part of the
24 The direct charter amendment and merger methods are compulsory by their
very terms, save where appraisal remedies are available. The indirect charter
amendment method is more often optional in theory and compulsory in practice.
See Note (1938) 33 ILL. L. REV. 212; cf. Kreicker v. Naylor Pipe Co., 374 Ill. 364,
29 N. E.(2d) 502 (i94o).
25 Even the early cases agreed that majority consent was sufficient for changes
of an auxiliary nature which did not have the effect of altering the basic character
or purpose of a corporate enterprise. Changes of this type are discussed in SEC
REP. ON RaoaoANmTIoN COsmTTEES, PART VII (2938) 464-67, 477-78. See also
Curran, Minority Stockholders and the Amendment of Corporate Charters (2934)
32 M icH. L. REv. 743, 745; Dodd, Dissenting Stockholders and Amendments to
Corporate Charters (1927) 75 U. Or PA. L. REv. 585, 587.
26 Sections 26 and 59 respectively. DEL. REv. CODE (i935) §§ 2058, 2091.
1941]
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charter, the preferred stock contract is subject to this alteration
process. The theory is that, upon the original issuance of pre-
ferred stock, the investor consents in advance to certain changes
in his contract when such changes are approved by the requisite
proportion of the shareholders. 7 Phrased more traditionally,
power has been reserved by the corporation to change the contract,
and the problem is one of determining which contractual rights are
subject to this reserve power.28 With respect to most rights of the
preferred shareholder this procedure has operated smoothly and
the dissenter has usually met defeat.2" In regard to his right to
accrued dividends, however, as a result of its having been singled
out for special protection, he has fared somewhat better. Whether
this particular right is subject to change upon less than unanimous
consent brings us back to the two questions posed at the beginning
of this article. Has the corporation the power to alter the right to
accrued dividends over the objection of a single preferred share-
holder in the light of a given preferred stock contract? If it has
that power, will the courts nevertheless impose any equitable lim-
itations? The answers given by the Delaware and New Jersey
courts are now to be explored.
27 The theory extends, of course, to all changes in the preferred stock contract.
See Note (1941) 54 HAgv. L. REv. 1368 (changes in voting rights). Applicable
accrued dividend adjustment cases include Federal United Corp. v. Havender, ii
A.(2d) 331, 338 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1940); Consolidated Film Industries, Inc. v. Johnson,
197 Atl. 489, 493 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1937) ; Keller v. Wilson & Co., 21 Del. Ch. 391, 414,
19o Atl. 1i5, i26 (Sup. Ct. 1936); Morris v. American Public Utilities Co., 14 Del.
Ch. 136, 122 AtI. 696 (Ch. 1923). Cf. Berger v. United States Steel Corp., 63 N. J.
Eq. 809, 824, 53 AtI. 68, 74 (1902).
28 The phrase "reserve power" is used with reluctance because its many con-
notations may tend to confuse rather than assist the reader. The "consent in
advance" form of statement covers the same field of ideas with more precision
and directs attention to the controlling factor. Both modes of expression will be
found applicable in either of the two principal situations which arise in accrued
dividend adjustments: (i) Where the problem is one of construction of the pre-
ferred stock contract (articles of incorporation plus corporation statutes) to ascer-
tain whether the right to accrued dividends had been clearly made subject to change;
(2) Where the problem is the constitutional one of determining whether the right
to arrears is to be protected against alteration pursuant to a statute enacted after
issuance of the preferred stock. See note 5 supra.
29 A great number of the preferred shareholder's rights to prior participation in
earnings and assets have been held subject to alteration. The only rights which
have received anywhere near the protection accorded the right to dividend arrearages
are redemption and preemptive rights. See SEC REP. ON REORGAZ-IZATION COM-
FTTEES, PART VII (1938) 493-518; Notes (1941) 89 U. or PA. L. REv. 789, 793,
(I937) 46 YALE L. J. 985, 991.
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THE EXISTENCE OF CORPORATE POWER- THE DELAWARE ViEw
The problem of adjustment of accrued dividends on cumulative
preferred stocks first became of general importance in the latter
half of the decade 1930-1940 when many of the corporations
emerging from the depression were seeking to clear up heavy ar-
rearages3 While prior to 1936 various courts had indicated that
the right to accrued dividends was one especially entitled to pro-
tection, it was the decision of the Delaware Supreme Court in that
year in Keller v. Wilson & Co."1 which gave the right its greatest
semblance of sanctity. Yet in less than four years the Keller case
had been stripped of its significance by the superficially startling
decision of the same court in Federal United Corp. v. Havender.32
In these two cases, together with a few others, is set forth a full
exposition of the Delaware view that the only question is one of
the existence of corporate power.
Delaware has been the most important state of incorporation
since about I915."3 Its liberal statute, enacted in 1899, was de-
signed to be attractive not only because of its low incorporation
fees and taxes, but also because of the elasticity of its provisions
permitting great freedom of action to corporate managements.
The charter amendment section of this Delaware statute, Section
26, was particularly well designed to lend itself to this latter ob-
jective. Since the first attempts to adjust accrued dividends were
on the basis of Section 26, it will be discussed first, reserving the
merger statute and cases for subsequent consideration.
The history of Section 2 6 is fundamental to an understanding of
the Delaware charter amendment cases. As originally enacted in
19oi, it merely authorized a corporation to amend its charter so as
to change its corporate powers and purposes, its corporate name,
and to increase or decrease its authorized capital stock. 4 In 1909
a clause was added permitting" any other change or alteration." "
In 1917 the procedural requirements of Section 26 were amended
to provide for a class vote of preferred stock upon any amend-
30 See Notes (I937) 46 YALE L. J. 985, ('937) 31 ILL. L. RIv. 66i, 668.
31 21 Del. Ch. 391, 19o Atl. IIS (Sup. Ct. 1936).
32 11 A.(2d) 331 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1940).
33 See LARcoM, THE DELAWARE CORPORATION (1937) 155.
34 Del. Laws igoi, c. 167, § 26. The x9oi act was a revision of the original
1899 act which had provided for similar charter amendments in § 135. Del. Laws
1899, C. 273. 35 Del. Laws igog, c. 155, § i.
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ment altering or changing its preferences. 6 Finally in 1927 Sec-
tion 26 assumed substantially its present form by the addition of
the power to amend a charter so as to reclassify capital stock by:
Changing the number, par value, designations, preferences, or relative,
participating, optional or other special rights of the shares, or the qualifi-
cations, limitations or restrictions of such rights .... 37
Turning now to the cases, there is one decision in 1923, long be-
fore Keller v. Wilson & Co., which marks out the pattern of the
recent cases. In Morris v. American Public Utilities Co.,8 the
Court of Chancery " upheld a recapitalization plan with respect to
a corporation formed in 1912 insofar as it superimposed upon an
existing preferred stock and arrearages two issues of new prior
preferred stock. This part of the plan is an example of what is
referred to today as the indirect method of adjusting dividend ar-
rearages. The Chancellor refused, however, to sanction another
part of the recapitalization plan whereby accrued dividends of $24
per share on the existing preferred were to be directly " cancelled."
The reasoning of the Chancellor with respect to the new prior
preferred stocks was simple. By the original preferred stock con-
tract the preferred shareholders had consented in advance to the
creation, by a majority vote of their class,4° of new issues of stock
prior to their own with respect to dividends and liquidation rights.
36 Del. Laws 1917, c. 113, § 12.
37 Del. Laws 1927, C. 85, § 1o. (Italics added.)
88 14 Del. Ch. 136, 122 Atl. 696 (Ch. 1923).
39 While the Delaware Chancery is a court of first instance, its decisions, like
those of the New Jersey Chancery Court, have long met with respect and possess
a prestige superior to that of decisions of ordinary intermediate appellate courts.
The Chancellor is the highest judicial officer of the state. Morris v. American
Public Utilities Co. in particular carries authority because it has been specifically
approved on several occasions by the Delaware Supreme Court. See Shanik v.
White Sewing Machine Corp., i9 A.(2d) 831, 834 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1941); Keller v.
Wilson & Co., 21 Del. Ch. 391, 399, 19o Atl. iis, iig (Sup. Ct. 1936) ; Penington
v. Commonwealth Hotel Construction Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 394, 400, i55 Atl. 514, 517
(Sup. Ct. 1931).
40 At the time Morris v. American Public Utilities Co. was decided, § 26 pro-
vided for a majority class vote whenever an amendment altered "the preferences
given to any one or more classes of preferred stock, authorized by the certificate
of incorporation." The Chancellor seemingly assumed the clause "authorized by
the certificate of incorporation" modified" classes of preferred stock " and not " the
preferences given," for he was careful to point out that the alteration was not'in the
stated preference over the common stock, but in relation to earnings and assets.
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In other words, because Section 26 was part of the contract, the
corporation had the power to do so. In the course of its opinion the
court elaborated the idea that only a "preference" was involved,
that the existing preferred stock contract permitted a change in
preferences, and hence that there was no basis for objection. This
talk of preferences seems to have been relevant only in regard to
the question of a majority class vote of the existing preferred. In
any event the new prior preferred stocks were held to be superior to
the old preferred, and the corporation was expressly permitted to
pay dividends upon them without making any payment on the ar-
rearages of the old stock.4
This alteration he held required a majority class vote of the preferred stock. Sec-
tion 26 now provides, however, for a majority class vote whenever an amendment
alters " the preferences, special rights or powers given to any one or more classes
of stock, by the Certificate of Incorporation, so as to affect such class or classes of
stock adversely." The clause " certificate of incorporation" now clearly modifies
the words " preferences, special rights or powers." As a result the argument can be
made that the construction in Morris v. American Public Utilities Co. can no longer
be applied, because § 26 requires the class vote only when the specific preferences,
special rights or powers conferred by the certificate of incorporation are changed
and not when the position of the preferred stock in the corporation has been altered.
The practice, however, is still to submit such proposed amendments to the preferred
stock as a class. And a recent case which dealt with the class vote provision made
no reference to this change, although the other changes made by the r927 amend-
ment were discussed. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co.,
21 A.(2d) 178 (Del. Ch. 1941).
41 14 Del. Ch. 136, 154, 122 Atl. 696, 7o5 (Ch. 1923). The holding on this
point was approved in Shanik v. White Sewing Machine Corp., ig A.(2d) 831, 834
(Del. Sup. Ct. 194). This view should be compared with that in Yoakam v.
Providence Biltmore Hotel Co., 34 F.(2d) 533 (D. R. I. 1929), involving a Dela-
ware corporation, where the payment of dividends on a new prior preferred issue
from an available surplus existing at the date of the adjustment was prohibited, but
was permitted from subsequent earnings of the corporation. But cf. Johnson v.
Fuller, 36 F. Supp. 744 (E. D. Pa. 1940), af'd, 121 F.(2d) 618 (C. C. A. 3d, 194),
involving a Pennsylvania corporation, where the federal court refused to enjoin
payment of dividends on a new prior preferred stock notwithstanding an earned
surplus of about $2o,ooo,ooo. The court pointed out that this surplus existed in
1933, up to which time dividends had been regularly paid on the old preferred
stock, and that from 1933 through 1939 the company paid out more in dividends on
the old preferred than had been earned over the same period. Consequently, the
surplus was not built up by withholding earnings from the old preferred stock, but
since cumulative preferred stock was involved, the date on which the surplus arose
would seem to be irrelevant. The court also pointed out that the old preferred stock
(no par) had been carried at a stated value less than its liquidating value, and hence
the earned surplus actually would be offset by this difference. This last fact, how-
ever, would not seem to affect the vital fact that $2o,ooo,ooo of earnings had been
withheld.
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The second part of the recapitalization plan, which sought to
cancel the arrearages, involved an amendment operating directly
on the accrued dividends, an example of the so-called direct
method. Again the issue was merely one of existence of corporate
power in terms of the preferred stock contract. The Chancellor
was wholly unable to find that such power existed, for although
" preferences " could be altered, the right to accrued dividends was
deemed to be considerably more than a preference. In so deciding,
the Chancellor made the first forceful use of the "vested right"
terminology, and his language has been cited again and again in
subsequent decisions. Yet it has been virtually overlooked that
his purpose was merely to make clear that the right to the accruals
was not a preference and that consequently the preferred share-
holders had not consented in advance to the change. Moreover,
little attention has been given to the point that the right to accrued
dividends was held to be vested only as against the common stock.
There is no doubt but that the 1927 amendment to Section 26,
set forth above, was designed to carry even further the liberal pol-
icy of the Delaware corporation law. There is also some evidence
that the inclusion of "special rights "as a fit subject for alteration
was for the specific purpose of permitting the elimination of ac-
crued dividends by the direct charter amendment method which
had failed in Morris v. American Public Utilities Co.2 In the
years immediately following 1927 there was no occasion to test out
the amended Section 26, but in 1935, when adjustment of accrued
dividends had become of practical importance, it was only natural
that the problem was approached on the assumption that Section
26 was available and that the chief obstacle was obtaining the
requisite majority consent of the preferred shareholders. This as-
sumption, however, received a rude jolt in 1936 in Keller v. Wilson
& Co43 I
Wilson & Company was incorporated in Delaware in 1925. Its
authorized capital stock, disregarding a 7 % cumulative first pre-
ferred which was not involved in the subsequent litigation, con-
sisted of 5% Class A preferred stock, cumulative after 193o, and
42 So the Chancellor believed in Keller v. Wilson & Co., 21 Del. Ch. 13, 18o Atl.
584 (Ch. 1935), and such was the understanding of the corporation bar. See also
Harr v. Pioneer Mechanical Corp., 65 F.(2d) 332 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933).
43 2x Del. Ch. 391, i90 At. II5 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
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common stock. In 1935, when the Class A arrearages amounted
to more than $21 per share, a charter amendment was adopted by
a majority vote of each class converting each share of Class A stock
and arrearages into five shares of common stock.4" An objecting
Class A shareholder brought suit to have the amendment declared
null and void. The Chancellor, in an opinion wholly consistent
with the purported Delaware policy of liberal construction, denied
him relief.4" On appeal the Delaware Supreme Court startled the
corporate world by invalidating the amendment. Indicating that
the time had come to halt the" increasing latitude" of the charter
amendment power, the court defined the right to accrued dividends
in sweeping " vested right" terminology. The most precise of the
many definitions by the court stated:
The right to have paid at some future time the accumulation of divi-
dends on preferred stock, was as between the stockholders, a fixed and
vested right, having the nature and character of a debt, postponable in
enjoyment until the creation of a fund from which payment legally could
be made.46
44 The Class A stock was no par, its stated value was $5o per share, and its
liquidating value and redemption price were each $75 per share. From December
14, 1934, the date on which the board of directors first proposed the adjustment
plan, to February 23, 1935, when the plan became effective, the corporation had
an earned surplus of $2,249,o62 available for the Class A stock (slightly over $7
per share), allowance having been made for total arrears on the 7% first cumula-
tive preferred of $5,965,26o. On December 13, x934, the day before the plan was
proposed, the Class A stock sold at 308-32-1 and the common stock at 7-71; on Feb-
ruary 25, 1935, the first day on which the Class A stock was no longer listed, the
common stock sold at 5Z-6. Thus the conversion ratio at the date the plan was
proposed bore some relation to the market value of the two classes of shares, with
perhaps a slight allowance being made for the arrearages. In every other way, how-
ever, it would seem that the Class A shareholders did not receive "fair" treatment
under the adjustment. Nor were their sacrifices compensated for in the light of
later events. Total dividends paid on the common since the plan became effective
have amounted only to $1.371, all of which were paid during 1935 through 1937.
As of May 1, 1941, dividends had accrued on the new senior $6 preferred stock to
the amount of $6 per share.
45 2i Del. Ch. 13, iSo At. 584 (Ch. 1935).
46 21 Del. Ch. 391, 411, 19o Atl. 115, 124 (Sup. Ct. 1936). This particular ex-
cerpt was indicated to be a paraphrase of the reasoning in Penington v. Common-
wealth Hotel Construction Co., 17 Del. Ch. 394, 55 Atl. 514 (Sup. Ct. 1936). Note
also the statement at 42, 29o At. at 125: "When the nature and character of the
right of a holder of cumulative preferred stock to unpaid dividends, which have
accrued thereon through the passage of time, is examined in a case where that right
was accorded protection when the corporation was formed and the stock was issued,
a just public policy, which seeks the equal and impartial protection of the interests
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The decision itself was divided by the court into two parts. The
first dealt with the constitutional question raised by the fact that
the corporation had been organized prior to the 1927 amendment
of Section 26. Assuming not only that the 1927 amendment spe-
cifically authorized the direct elimination of accrued dividends (an
assumption held to be erroneous in the second part of the decision),
but also that the amendment was applicable as a matter of con-
struction to a corporation organized prior to its enactment, the
court went on to consider the sufficiency of the reserve power to au-
thorize the alteration of the right to accrued dividends. It then
held that the right to arrears, being a vested property right, was
"secured against destruction by the Federal and State Constitu-
tions." " The court in effect held that no power existed to make
the change because the state could not constitutionally confer such
a power. When the Class A stock was issued the holders consented
in advance to changes of its preferences, but not to everything
which the legislature might choose to propose. Since the right to
accrued dividends was more than a preference, the shareholder had
not consented to be bound by a majority of his class and unani-
mous consent was essential. Otherwise his property would be
taken away from him in an unconstitutional fashion.4"
In the second part of the decision the court put aside the consti-
tutional question and addressed itself solely to the matter of
whether Section 26 as amended in 1927 did authorize the elim-
ination of accrued dividends. The court was unable to find any
such power, and a few months later in another case, Consolidated
Film Industries, Inc. v. Johnson,49 it definitely settled the issue by
reiterating this interpretation with respect to a corporation organ-
ized after 1927. While the court employed sweeping language, it
was made very clear that the basic issue lay in the original pre-
ferred stock contract. Thus, as in Morris v. American Public
Utilities Co., the consent in advance to change " preferences "was
inadequate so far as accrued dividends were concerned, so here the
of all, demands that the right be regarded as a vested right of property secured
against destruction by the Federal and State Constitutions."
47 See full quotation in note 46 supra.
48 The court never makes it entirely clear whether it is proceeding under the
prohibition against impairment of contracts in the United States Constitution, or
the due process clause of the United States and Delaware Constitutions.
49 197 Ati. 489 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1937).
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term "special rights " was insufficient. Beneath all the verbiage,
it is clear that the court actually meant no more than that gen-
eral language would be inadequate to empower the adjustment of
accrued dividends. Apparently only with precise authorization,
perhaps in words of " one syllable," would the court hold that the
preferred shareholder had consented in advance to some alteration
of his right to dividends which had accrued."
If the Keller case and its sequel are analyzed in the light of the
more recent decisions in Federal United Corp. v. Havender and
Shanik v. White Sewing Machine Corp.,5 they will be seen to fit
into a neat theoretical pattern in which the all-important issue is
the existence of corporate power. But in 1936 the implications
of the Keller case were not clear, and much speculation ensued as
to its limits. Many corporations entirely abandoned pending
schemes to cancel or adjust arrears on the assumption that the
Keller case required payment of arrears in cash in full in order to
satisfy dissenters. 2 In some quarters the case was deemed to in-
dicate that a rule of strict priority, similar to that applicable in
equity and bankruptcy reorganizations, would now be applied as
between classes of shareholders in recapitalizations." On all sides
it was felt that a rule of public policy had been laid down under
which no statutory provision, however explicit, could operate with
respect to cumulative dividends already accrued."
50 See 197 At. 489, 493 (Del. Sup. C'.1937), where the court said, "But he,
who contends that the State has conferred a power upon corporations, by charter
amendment, to change such a substantial contractual right as the right to divi-
dends on cumulative preferred stock accrued under the contract through time,
should be able to point to statutory language so clear and precise as to permit
of no reasonable doubt that a retrospective operation was intended." See Curran,
Minority Stockholders and the Amendment of Corporate Charters (i934) 32 McH.
L. REV. 743, 753.
51 1i A.(2d) 331 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1940), infra pp. 90-93, and ig A.(2d) 831 (Del.
Sup. Ct. z94I), infra pp. 93-95, respectively.
52 See Notes (1937) 31 ILL. L. REv. 661, 668, n.3g, (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 985,
989, n.12.
53 Such was the opinion of many members of the corporation bar. Cf. also
Meck and Cary, Regulation of Corporate Finance and Management under the
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (1938) 52 H.Av. L. RFv. 226, 248, n.78.
Note (1940) 49 YA L. J. 1297. This idea was rejected by the Delaware court in
1941. See the excerpt from Shanik v. White Sewing Machine Corp., 19 A.(2d) 831
(Del. Sup. Ct. 1941), note 81 infra.
.54 This is apparent in the many law review discussions of the Keller and
Havender cases.
E941]
HeinOnline  -- 55 Harv. L. Rev.  87 1941-1942
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
Yet if the effervescence of language in the Keller and Consoli-
dated Films cases is disregarded, the rule laid down is the narrow
one set forth above. In the Keller case in the lower court, the
Chancellor made it clear in his opening sentence, which read:
"The question in this case is one of corporate power." " To re-
iterate the general approach of this article, the contractual rights
of preferred shareholders are fixed upon the original issuance of the
shares. Certain of these rights may be altered in various ways,
and to determine which rights can be altered and in what manner,
the preferred shareholder must look to his contract, which, of
course, includes both the applicable statutes and the articles of in-
corporation. As a result of these two cases the preferred share-
holder in a Delaware corporation knows that his right to accrued
dividends is secure from direct attack under Section 26. Whether
the class of preferred stock to which his shares belong was created
before or after 192 7, he knows that the 192 7 amendment to Section
26 did not confer any power to adjust his accrued dividends."
Even if Section 2 6 were to be amended so as to provide specifically
for the adjustment, elimination, or discharge of accrued dividends,
in the manner of a recent Ohio statute," he knows that such an
amendment is ineffective for constitutional reasons if his preferred
stock antedated the new statutory provision. 8 This is true with
55 21 Del. Ch. 13, 14, i8o At. 584, 585 (Ch. 1935).
56 Indirect types of adjustment plans, of course, were still feasible. See supra
pp. 82-83 and infra pp. 93-94.
57 Onio GEN. COD ANN. (PAGE, SuPP. 1940) § 8623-14 (3) (i), enacted in 1939,
permits charter amendments which "change any or all of the express terms and
provisions or designations of issued or unissued shares of any class or series; which
change, if desired, may include the discharge, adjustment or elimination of rights to
accrued undeclared cumulative dividends on any such class." The same section
gives dissenting shareholders an appraisal remedy and § 8623-15 (3) (4) provides
for a class vote on the amendment. See also note i9 supra.
Virginia also passed a specific provision in 1938, but it is more limited'than the
Ohio statute. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1940) § 3780. It provides for charter
amendments which create new classes of shares which may be issued for outstand-
ing shares of stock " on the terms and conditions to be stated in such amendment;
which said terms and conditions may, if ninety per cent of each class of stock-
holders affected thereby agree, provide for the elimination of all accrued and un-
declared dividends on any class of stock where such dividends have either not
been earned or have not been declared because of deficit in the capital of the cor-
poration, whether such dividends have heretofore accrued or may hereafter ac-
crue. . . ." See note sg infra.
58 Consolidated Film Industries, Inc. v. Johnson, 197 Atl. 489 (Del. Sup. Ct.
1937) ; Romer v. Porcelain Products, Inc., 2 A.(2d) 75 (Del. Ch. 1938).
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respect not only to cumulative dividends accrued up to the enact-
ment of the statutory amendment, but also to dividends accrued
thereafter." He also knows, however, that he is not entitled to
have his dividends accrue with indestructible attributes indefi-
nitely, for he has consented in advance to almost every conceiva-
ble change in his right to future dividends." Thus, at any time un-
der Section 26, a corporation has the power to alter the preferred
stock contract so that dividends accruing after the date of the cor-
porate action shall be subject to adjustment, elimination, or dis-
charge upon appropriate shareholder consent." That is, in the
Delaware terminology, the right to dividends can be changed from
"vested" to "defeasible." Finally, of course, if a preferred stock
is issued after the enactment of a specific statute like that in Ohio,
the preferred shareholder knows from the beginning that his right
to dividends as they accrue is " defeasible." 62
59 See Consolidated Film Industries, Inc. v. Johnson, 197 AUt. 489, 493 (Del. Sup.
Ct. 1937) ; cf. Dodd, Dissenting Stockholders and Amendments to Corporate Char-
ters (1927) 75 U. OF PA. L. REv. 723-26. But note the language of the Virginia stat-
ute set forth in note 57 supra, which is literally applicable to dividends accrued
prior to passage of the statute. Unless the Virginia courts hold that the right to
accrued dividends is not "vested" when there is no surplus, a construction the
statute itself suggests, this attempt would seem to be ineffectual on constitutional
grounds. The provision as to dividends which accrue after the enactment, how-
ever, may be construed as a directly imposed amendment by the legislature, op-
erating immediately on the right to future dividends. In this way preferred stocks
antedating the statute may be partially brought within its purview even if the
Delaware cases are followed and no corporate action of the type suggested in the
text is taken.
60 See discussion supra p. 76.
61 It is not known whether any corporation ever passed such a charter amend-
ment, but there is some precedent in trust indenture provisions permitting less than
ioo% of the bondholders to waive interest defaults, consent to reductions in in-
terest rates, and the like. A charter provision of this type could easily be inserted
at the time a new prior preferred stock is created under an indirect adjustment plan
or where a new preferred stock is the consequence of a merger. For many reasons,
however, mostly purely human, it is unlikely that such charter provisions will be
popular. See Note (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 985, 993. This same result could ensue
from a direct legislative enactment making all dividends accruing thereafter "de-
feasible." See note 59 supra.
62 A few of the commentators seem to imply, unwittingly of course, that the
Keller case gave such a protected status to accrued dividends that even a specific
statute passed before a preferred stock was issued would be insufficient to permit
an adjustment of dividend arrearages. Actually it has always been recognized that
power to adjust or even discharge accrued dividends will be effective if it was ex-
plicitly conferred upon the initial formation of a corporation. See Dodd, Dissenting
Stockholders and Amendments to Corporate Charters (1927) 75 U. oF PA. L. REv.
723, 727.
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Only twenty days after the decision in the Keller case, another
Delaware corporation, Federal United Corporation, carried out a
merger transaction which was destined to give rise to another de-
cision obliterating, for all practical purposes, the effect of the
Keller case, and, in addition, creating the anomaly in Delaware of a
right which is protected under Section 26, but is not so protected
under the merger provisions of Section 59. Federal United Cor-
poration had been organized in 1932, and by 193,6 there were ac-
crued dividends of $29 per share on its outstanding $6 cumulative
preferred stock.63 In that year Federal United Corporation, pur-
suant to Section 59 of the Delaware corporation law, merged with
its wholly owned and inactive subsidiary, the subsidiary being the
surviving corporation.64 This merger, which was approved by
91.8% of Federal United's outstanding shares, but not by a class
vote of the preferred stock,6" provided that each $6 preferred share
and arrearages should receive one share of the surviving corpora-
tion's new $3 preferred stock and six shares of its new Class A
common stock. Federal United's common shareholders were en-
titled to exchange share for share for the surviving corporation's
new Class B common stock, and, to create a surplus for the surviv-
ing corporation out of which dividends could be paid on the new $3
preferred, certain large common shareholders donated preferred
and common shares to the surviving corporation. Prior to the
merger Federal United had no earned surplus in excess of the total
accruals. 6
Seven months after the vote on the merger, a $6 preferred share-
holder who had not made the exchange sought to have the merger
63 The stated value of the $6 cumulative preferred was $io per share and the
liquidation or dissolution value $ioo per share plus accumulated dividends.
64 That the merger was treated as a recapitalization in the minds of Federal
United's management seems clear from the statement in the merger plan sent to
the shareholders in soliciting their approval: "It is proposed to carry out a volun-
tary plan for the readjustment of the capital structure of Federal United Corpora-
tion by means of a merger. . . 2" Havender v. Federal United Corp., 2 A.(2d)
143, 147 (Del. Ch. 1938). The date of incorporation of the subsidiary into which
Federal United was merged does not appear in the report, although apparently it
was not created for the specific purpose of the merger. See Havender v. Federal
United Corp., 6 A.(2d) 618, 621 (Del. Ch. 1939).
65 No class vote is provided for by § 59, but merely the votes "representing
two-thirds of the total number of shares."
66 The capital surplus was $744,988.16, the total accruals $510,748. Under Dela-
ware law dividends could be paid out of the capital surplus.
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declared void. No claim was made that the terms of the merger
were unfair. The case was heard twice in the Chancery Court,
once before the late Chancellor Wolcott and again before the pres-
ent Chancellor." In both instances it was held that the merger
was invalid with respect to the complainant, the principle ground
being that a merger of a parent corporation with its wholly owned
and inactive subsidiary was not within the purview of the merger
statute, especially when its obvious purpose was to circumvent the
rule of Keller v. Wilson & Co.
On appeal the merger was held valid in an opinion which severely
limits, if it does not openly retreat from, the holding in the Keller
case." The Supreme Court held first that the merger statute did
sanction the merger of a parent with its ioo% owned subsidiary,"
and secondly, that accrued dividends were not to be protected upon
a merger'under Section 59 as they were under Section 26. On this
second point the court made it entirely clear that the sole issue be-
fore it was one of corporate power and not of unfairness." It
stressed the difference between Section 59 and Section 26, espe-
cially the fact that the former had been part of the original Dela-
ware corporation statute in I899. In striking language the court
refused to give a narrow construction to Section 59 and instead in-
terpreted its presence at the time Federal United was organized in
67 Havender v. Federal United Corp., 2 A.(2d) 143 (Del. Ch. 1938) (Wolcott),
6 A.(2d) 618 (Del. Ch. 1939) (Harrington).
68 Federal United Corp. v. Havender, ii A.(2d) 331 (Del. Sup. Ct. 194o).
69 On April 13, 1937, § 59A was added to the Delaware corporation statute,
dealing with proceedings for merger of parent corporations and wholly owned
subsidiaries. The present Chancellor seized upon this as indicative of a lack of
power in 1936 under § 59 for a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary to merge.
6 A.(2d) 618, 623 (Del. Ch. 1939). This conclusion can hardly be justified, and the
Supreme Court construed § 59A as merely affording a simplified procedure for
merger in the parent-subsidiary situation, and not as involving a grant of new power
to accomplish a type of merger theretofore barred. ii A.(2d) 331, 337 (Del. Sup.
Ct. 1940). In its turn, however, the Supreme Court illogically seemed to feel that
the passage of § 59A was of weight in holding the Federal United merger within
the purview of § 59. It should be remembered that the transaction involved the
merger of Federal United, the parent, into the wholly owned subsidiary, a pro-
cedure just the reverse of the method ordinarily used to eliminate an unnecessary
subsidiary. Moreover, § 59A definitely envisages the normal type and provides only
for a " one-way " merger of the subsidiary into its parent, and not for the transac-
tion carried out by Federal United.
70 No contention was made by the complaining preferred shareholders that the
merger plan was unfair or inequitable. See ii A.(2d) 331, 343 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1940).
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1932 as clearly making the complainant's right to accrued divi-
dends defeasible instead of vested in nature. It said:
The average intelligent mind must be held to know that dividends may
accumulate on preferred stock, and that in the event of a merger of the
corporation issuing the stock with another corporation, the various rights
of shareholders, including the right to dividends on preference stock ac-
crued but unpaid, may, and perhaps must, be the subject of reconcilement
and adjustment; for, in many cases, it would be impracticable to effect
a merger if the rights attached to the shares could not be dealt with.71
If, the case had been one of an ordinary merger between two dis-
tinct corporations, there could be little quarrel with the court's rea-
soning. Under such circumstances adjustment of dividend arrear-
ages is an integral part of the merger process, which, after all, is
fairly ancient so far as American corporation law is concerned."
The theory of merger is essentially one of compulsory conversion
of shareholders of one corporation into shareholders in another by
operation of law. The objecting shareholders have no alternative
to this conversion other than to seek the value of their shares under
appraisal statutes or other available remedies. Except where
the terms of the merger are unfair or inequitable, they have no
right to insist upon remaining shareholders in the original cor-
poration.
Thus the Havender case has drawn a clear distinction between
the adjustment of preferred dividends by a compulsory plan under
Section 59 and by a compulsory plan under Section 26.11 It seems
to have opened the door for any corporation which has a wholly
71 11 A.(2d) at 338. The court also revived the thesis of Davis v. Louisville
Gas & Electric Co., 16 Del. Ch. 157, 142 AtI. 654 (Ch. 1928), that the public in-
terest required this result.
72 Statutory merger and consolidation had its origin in America in the early
railroad and canal era from 1820 to 185o, probably before any classification of
shares. See Note (1935) 45 YALE L. J. ioS, iog, n.ig. The method of effecting
changes by charter amendment is of relatively recent origin.
73 The availability of the appraisal remedy was pointed out but not stressed.
See ii A.(2d) at 338-39.
74 Pointing out that there was "a clear distinction between the situations"
under § 26 and § 59, and in "the modes of procedure applicable to each," the court
declared that not only had there been no invasion of any legal or equitable right in
the merger, but also that no "moral wrong" had been committed. It is not an
overstatement to say that the opinion in Keller v. Wilson & Co. had placed the
problem on somewhat of a moral basis.
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owned subsidiary or even a partly owned subsidiary to deal with
accrued dividends under the merger or consolidation provisions of
Section 59. While it does not decide whether a wholly owned sub-
sidiary may be created and then the merger procedure carried out,
it is difficult to perceive why such a method should not be upheld."
The fact that the Havender case involved a merger of a parent cor-
poration with its own subsidiary is what gives the case its terrific
impact on the doctrine of the Keller case. Had the court chosen to
continue the policy laid down in the Keller case, it would have been
simple to have adopted the approach of both Chancellors and
deem the merger merely technical and a subterfuge. Such a view
would have continued to preferred shareholders the protection
against compulsory adjustment of accrued dividends other than
by payment of cash except in the case of a bona fide merger be-
tween non-affiliated corporations, although, of course, it would still
have left open the indirect technique of making an offer of new
prior preferred in lieu of arrears. In failing to take that position
the court seems to have indicated that the Keller decision went too
far and was basically unsound. On policy grounds this result is
open to serious question, but so far as corporate theory is con-
cerned, the cases have now fallen into a neat pattern. The ques-
tion is merely one of the existence of corporate power in relation
to the original preferred stock contract.
It has recently been made clear that the Havender case not only
upheld the direct method of merger but also dispelled any linger-
ing doubt as to the legality of the indirect charter amendment
device under Section 26. In Shanik v. White Sewing Machine
Corp.,76 the Delaware Supreme Court reaffirmed the 1923 case of
Morris v. American Public Utilities Co." and upheld the indirect
method in a recapitalization designed to clear up arrears of $31
per share on the $4 cumulative preferred stock of the White Sewing
Machine Corporation which had been issued in 1926. The plan
was the traditional one of creating a new class of preferred stock
with rights to dividends and on liquidation superior to those of the
75 But see Chancellor Wolcott's strong dictum in the opinion on the first hear-
ing, 2 A.(2d) 143, 147 (Del. Ch. 1938). This very point is currently up for de-
cision in the federal district court for Delaware, in litigation involving the York
Ice Machinery Company.
76 x9 A.(2d) 831 (Del. Sup. Ct. 194).
77 Supra pp. 82-84.
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existing preferred. The existing preferred shareholders were then
given the option of retaining their shares with arrearages or ex-
changing those shares plus accrued dividends for shares of the new
prior preferred and for new common shares. At the time of the
plan, the corporation had a substantial deficit from operations."
The plan was approved by a majority vote of both the existing pre-
ferred and common classes.
The attack on the plan was directed principally to the priority
of the new prior preferred to current dividends as against the ar-
rears on the bld preferred, for there was little room for contending
that the new prior preferred could not be legally created. The
complainant argued that his right to accrued dividends was a
vested interest, secure against destruction, and that payment of
current dividends on the new prior preferred before payment of ar-
rears constituted just such destruction. In overruling his conten-
tion, the court said:
Here the transfer, if made, is purely voluntary, and any dissentient to
the plan may keep his original preference stock with all accumulated and
unpaid dividends thereon, and his relative position with reference to the
common stock (the only preference to which he was ever entitled) re-
mains precisely the same as if no change had been made. His accumu-
lated dividends in arrear are not, in any sense, wiped out, but remain
awaiting a legal fund for their payment, and they must be paid before
dividends are paid upon the common stock.79
Comment on the reasoning behind Shanik v. White Sewing Ma-
chine Corp. seems at this point rather redundant, but it illustrates
once again the attitude of the Delaware courts that the fundamen-
tal issue is one of corporate power. The contract of the existing
preferred shareholders permitted the creation of a new class of
prior preferred, as well as the issuance of such new stock for exist-
78 As of Dec. 31, 1937, the deficit from operations was $4,578,915, and the net
deficit, after deducting capital surplus of $1,411,687, was $3,167,228. POOR'S IN-
DUSTAML MANUiAL (1940) 1217. The total accruals as of the same date were $3,1oo,-
000.
79 i9 A.(2d) 831, 835 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1941). See also the case below, 15 A.(2d)
169, 173 (Del. Ch. 1940), where the Vice Chancellor said that Keller v. Wilson &
Co. and Consolidated Film Industries, Inc. v. Johnson "by no means hold that
language such as that of the charter of this defendant should be construed to ex-
press or imply an undertaking that accumulated dividends will in fact, and at all
events, be paid. .. "
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ing preferred stock and arrearages. 0 Again the issue of the fair-
ness of the plan was not before the court and the argument that
some principle of fairness should be applied, similar to that devel-
oped in equity and bankruptcy reorganizations, received short
shrift."' The presence of a sizable capital deficit may have influ-
enced the court to some extent, although on the whole it seems to
have been irrelevant." Summed up, the decision is simply the final
rivet necessary to complete the thesis that, regardless of the method
employed to adjust accrued dividends,, the corporate power doc-
trine is the decisive factor.
EQUITABLE LIMITATIONS AND THE EXISTENCE OF SURPLUS:
THE NEW JERSEY CASES
The New Jersey cases afford an equally interesting but some-
what more nebulous picture of the accrued dividends problem.
80 The court squarely held that the old preferred stock which could be ex-
changed for new prior preferred constituted consideration within § 14 of the Dela-
ware statute, permitting payment for stock "by cash, by labor done, by personal
property, or by real property or leases thereof." This holding and the similar one
in Johnson v. Lamprecht, 133 Ohio St. 567, 15 N. E.(2d) 127 (1938), effectively
illustrate the practical reaction to such academic suggestions as interpreting statutes
authorizing creation of prior stock as permitting issuance of the new prior stock
for cash only. See Becht, The Power to Remove Accrued Dividends by Charter
Amendment (1940) 40 COL. L. Rlv. 633, 648. See also SEC REP. oN REORGANIZA-
TION COM'IrxEFS, PART VII (1938) 496-5oo; Johnson v. Fuller, 121 F.(2d) 618,
625-26 (C. C. A. 3d, 194).
81 The court said: "The facts of the present case concerning the common stock,
the status of the company or the nature of the proceeding do not fall within the
category of Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U. S. io6, . . . or
similar cases cited." ig A.(2d) 831, 836 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1940. It is doubtful how
much weight can be given to this statement, since the court declined on procedural
grounds to consider the issue of fairness except as "inextricably interwoven with the
issue of legality." I9 A.(2d) at 834.
82 No Delaware case has explicitly indicated that the existence of a surplus is
even relevant. Surveying the four leading cases, 1936-1941, in one there was a
deficit (Shanik v. White Sewing Machine Corp.), in one a capital but not an earned
surplus (Federal United Corp. v. Havender), and in two there were substantial
earned surpluses (Consolidated Film Industries, Inc. v. Johnson and Keller v. Wil-
son; & Co.). The only language at all relevant is in Keller v. Wilson & Co., 2i Del.
Ch. 391, 411, i9o At. IIS, 124 (Sup. Ct. 1936), whence, from the different con-
text of the nature of the right to accrued dividends, this statement can be lifted:
"There seems to be no more reason to view the right of the shareholder as vested
[where there is a surplus] than in the case where no surplus exists at all, for in
either situation the shareholder has no immediately assertable right, nor may he
ever have such rights." See also cases discussed in note 41 supra.
1941]
HeinOnline  -- 55 Harv. L. Rev.  95 1941-1942
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
The corporation-law tradition in New Jersey had. its origin some
fifty years prior to that of Delaware, and this longer period of
evolution, contrary perhaps to normal expectation, has tended to
produce confusion. The New Jersey courts, moreover, and espe-
cially the chancery courts, have long been known for the relatively
greater surveillance which they give to corporate transactions in
the interests of investors. Especially pertinent to the present prob-
lem is the remark in one opinion: "While it is quite desirable that
corporations organized under the laws of New Jersey should have
ample proper latitude in making readjustments to meet new and
unexpected business conditions, it is even more important that the
contractual rights of stockholders of all classes of stock shall be
upheld. ... 83
In Delaware, it will be recalled, the fundamental issue was one
of corporate power in the sense of consent in advance by the pre-
ferred shareholders to the adjustment of dividend arrearages by
action of the majority. In New Jersey, however, an additional
limitation is seemingly imposed which can probably best be de-
scribed as an equitable requirement of fairness." So far as lan-
guage goes, this limitation can also be expressed as a lack of
power, but such a description seems inaccurate. In any event our
purpose here is to ascertain how and to what extent this additional
equitable limitation is imposed.
The existence of corporate power in New Jersey is an important
question, and under the proper circumstances the time element
can be of just as much significance as in Delaware. Moreover,
the reserve power question, so important in the Keller case,"5 is
complicated in New Jersey by a doctrine that the reserve power
can be exercised so as to affect the contract between the corpora-
tion and the shareholders, and that between the shareholders inter
sese, only if such exercise is in the public interest." With the
83 Concurring opinion of Judge White in General Investment Co. v. American
Hide & Leather Co., 98 N. J. Eq. 326, 338, X29 Atl. 244, 249 (1925).
84 This is not to say that the Delaware courts will not and have not imposed
equitable requirements of fairness in other situations, some of which are not unlike
the present accrued dividends problem. One example is the famous sale -of assets
rase, Allied Chemical & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co., 14 Del. Ch. 1, 12o Atl. 486
(Ch. 1923).
85 See supa p. 86.
26 This doctrine was established by Kean v. Johnson, 9 N. J. Eq- 401 (Ch. 1853),
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vicissitudes of this rule we are not here concerned, for it has been
of little relevance in the accrued dividend cases. 7 In this article,
in order to view the problem from a different perspective, we shall
assume that corporate power does exist; consequently the sole issue
for our purposes becomes one of limitations on its exercise.
A brief description of the New Jersey statutory background is
helpful. As to charter amendments, both the direct and indirect
methods seem to be sanctioned, although the former is of recent
enactment. Thus, under Chapter ii of Title 14 of the Revision
of 1937, in substance an amplification of the basic general corpora-
tion law of 1896, any corporation, by charter amendment approved
by two-thirds of each class, has had the specific power since 1896
to create additional classes of preferred stock, and since 1926 to
create new prior preferred or other special stocks."8 The 1896
statute alone has been deemed sufficient to confer corporate power
to carry out a recapitalization by the indirect method."s More-
over, since 192I any corporation has apparently had the power
to change its preferred stock into common stock and thus accom-
and Zabriskie v. Hackensack & N. Y. R. R., iS N. J. Eq. 178 (Ch. 1867), with which
compare Black v. Delaware & R. C. Co., 24 N. J. Eq. 455 (1873). The most recent
leading case is Allen v. Francisco Sugar Co., 92 N. J. Eq. 431, I2 AUt. 887 (1921).
That public interest here, as elsewhere, is flexible, see In re Mechanics Trust Co.,
xz9 N. J. Eq. 141, 1S Ati. 423 (Ch. 1935). See also discussion and cases collected
in Curran, Minority Stockholders and the Amendment of Corporate Charters (1934)
32 MicH. L. REv. 743, 747.
87 To a large extent this result has been mere coincidence. Since, however,
the time element (date of incorporation in relation to date of enactment of a con-
stitutionally valid empowering statute) is controlling under the corporate power
doctrine, the fact that pertinent New Jersey statutes were enacted somewhat earlier
than those of Delaware has had some effect. Even more important has been the
deliberate avoidance by certain vice chancellors of the lack of corporate power
ground when the alternative herein discussed was available. See Lonsdale Securities
Corp. v. International Mercantile Marine Co., ioi N. J. Eq. 554, 56o, 139 AtI. 5o,
52 (Ch. 1927).
88 N. ]. STAT. ANN. (1939) § 14:i-I. For the specific power to create " one
or more classes of preferred stock," see N. J. Laws 1896, c. I85, § 27. It was at one
time contended that contrary to the accepted New Jersey construction, this grant
permitted creation of preferred stock only where no class of preferred stock already
existed. See Note (1925) ii CoRN. L. Q. 78, 8o. For the present power to create
C one or more classes of preferred or prior preference or other special stock," see
N. J. Laws 1926, c. 318, § 7.
89 General Investment Co. v. American Hide & Leather Co., 98 N. J. Eq. 326,
129 Atl. 244 (1925).
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plish an adjustment by the direct method." Since 1926 the statute
has also contained a provision "for funding or satisfying rights,
in respect to dividends in arrears by the issuance of stock therefor
or otherwise. . . ., " This provision has never been construed and
can be said to have little practical significance, for a funding of
arrears could probably be accomplished without such an enact-
ment.92 Turning to merger and consolidation, in Chapter 12 of
Title 14 of the 1937 Revision, corporate power for domestic cor-
porations was conferred generally in 1893, made part of the gen-
eral revision in 1896, and in 1929 expanded so as to permit New
Jersey corporations to merge or consolidate with foreign corpo-
rations.9" This statutory framework does not differ markedly
from that of Delaware, except for the provision with regard to
funding arrears, and, as has been said, this seems to have been
given no vital force.
The additional limitation added by the New Jersey courts, de-
nominated above as a requirement of fairness, cannot be set forth
with the same preciseness as the corporate power requirement in
Delaware, and its validity is necessarily more doubtful. With this
word of caution, it can-be said that the rule of fairness seems to
revolve about the existence of an earned surplus. When a cor-
poration has an earned surplus at the date of a proposed adjust-
ment of accrued dividends, the preferred stock appears to have
a right to that surplus wlich cannot be divested, at least in favor
of the common stock. The preferred shareholders possess in it,
as against the common shareholders, what is called in the usual
terminology a " vested right." Thus, it is at least evident that in a
direct charter amendment adjustment, although the preferred
90 N. J. Laws 1921, C. 233, § I. Cf. Sander v. Janssen Dairy Corp., 36 F. Supp.
512 (D. N. J. 1940).
91 N. J. Laws 1926, C. 318, § 7.
92 The only case which even mentions this provision is Buckley v. Cuban Ameri-
can Sugar Co., 129 N. J. Eq. 322, 329, ig A.(2d) 820, 823 (Ch. 194o). See infra
p. ioo. See also discussion of the provision in SEC REP. ON REORGANIZATION CoM-
MITTEES, PAR VII (1938) 511-14. The preexisting power to create new classes of
preferred stock would seem sufficient to have covered funding of arrears on the
basis contemplated in Buckley v. Cuban American Sugar Co., "vested rights and
contractual obligations" being kept inviolate.
93 N. J. STAT. ANN. (1939) § 14:12-I. For the statutory development, see
N. J. Laws 1893, c. 67, § I; N. J. Laws x896, c. 185, § 104; N. J. Laws 1918, C. 271,
J I; N. J. Laws 1929, c. 261, § I.
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stock may be converted into common stock, the preferred has a
right to its accrued dividends to the extent of the earned surplus,
which right must be preserved against the common stock. Like-
wise, under the indirect charter amendment and the merger meth-
ods, the right to accrued dividends is held inviolate as against the
common stock. Furthermore, this rule of fairness may also have
a second application. It may possibly extend further, so that the
right to accrued dividends is vested in an earned surplus, not
merely as against the common stock, but generally. In other
words, the right to arrears may be so protected that no other class
of stock, prior preferred or otherwise, can participate in that
surplus unless the arrearages have first been paid in full. But
rather than generalize further, we shall proceed to the cases.
This equitable rule of fairness can best be described and ana-
lyzed by commencing with the most recent decision and working
back from it to several earlier cases. In Buckley v. Cuban Ameri-
can Sugar Co., 4 in the New Jersey chancery court, a corporation
organized in 19o6 had the usual capital structure. The preferred
was 7% cumulative and had arrears of $54.50 per share, or in the
aggregate, $3,884,767.50. There existed an earned surplus of
over $16,ooo,ooo at the date of the proposed adjustment." The
plan was an ingenious variation of the indirect method in that the
94 129 N. J. Eq. 322, 19 A.(2d) 820 (Ch. 194o). The precise weight to be given
this case is difficult to determine. The Chancellor enjoined the consummation of
the plan pending final hearing. The defendant corporation appealed from this
interim decree, and after full argument before the Court of Errors and Appeals, the
suit was settled. It should not be overlooked, however, that other opinions of
New Jersey chancellors at preliminary stages of cases, some of them involving ac-
crued dividends, have been long regarded as authoritative precedents. E.g., Wind-
hurst v. Central Leather Co., ioi N. J. Eq. 543, 138 Atl. 772 (Ch. 1927) ; Lonsdale
Securities Corp. v. International Mercantile Marine Co., ioi N. J. Eq. 554, 139 At.
5o (Ch. 1927).
95 Presumably this surplus represented earnings accumulated up to 1929, prior to
which year the 7% preferred stock had received its dividends in full. During the
eleven years, 1929-I939, there were net earnings in five years and net losses in six
years. On the basis of figures in Poor's Industrial Manual for 1940, 1936, and 1932,
the total losses in the eleven years exceeded the total profits by $2,757,o44, while
the net earnings for the five years exceeded the total dividends paid by $3,269,085.
If the entire net losses are chargeable against the net earnings, it appears that no
net earnings were withheld from the preferred stock during the eleven years. Thus,
the court in effect held that the right to accrued dividends was vested in net earn-
ings withheld from the common stock before 1929 and appearing today in the form
of earned surplus.
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new class of 5 % preferred stock, into which the existing 7%
preferred was made exchangeable, was not made a prior class. The
two stocks were placed on an equal basis as to current dividends,
but these current dividends on both classes were specifically given
priority in payment over the $54.50 of arrears on the 7% pre-
ferred. The new 5f% preferred also was redeemable, which the
7% was not, and was convertible into common. The plan allowed
the existing 7% preferred shareholders the alternative of retain-
ing their 7 % shares with arrears or exchanging each such share for
1.4 shares of the new 51 % preferred and $14.50 in cash.
It was clear that the corporation had the power to create the
new 51% preferred under the i896 Act. Under the Delaware
rationale, the 7 % preferred shareholders gave their consent in ad-
vance to such a creation upon a two-thirds class vote, which had
been obtained. Likewise the new shares could be issued in ex-
change for the old 7% stock. Yet on preliminary hearing the
Vice Chancellor enjoined the plan, and the nub of the decision
seems to have been the $i6,ooo,ooo earned surplus. The opinion
itself is mainly a recital of facts and allegations, and aside from a
lengthy quotation from an earlier case " and the citation of many
others, the only reason given for the result is this statement:
While it can be conceded that a corporation may have the right to
provide for funding or satisfying rights, in respect to dividends in ar-
rears by the issuance of stock therefor or otherwise (R.S. 14:z-1 (n)),
however, the amendment must preserve and hold inviolate vested rights
and contractual obligations.
7
Since the court itself was so chary with explanation, speculation
is permissible both as to the limits of the decision and the reasoning
behind it. Did the court recognize that under the plan the right,
whatever it may be, of the 7% preferred stock to the $i6,ooo,ooo
earned surplus was in no sense divested in so far as the common
stock was concerned? Why did it seem so willing, aside from the
interim nature of the proceeding, to grant an injunction against the
consummation of the plan and not content itself with an order
reserving the $i 6,ooo,ooo earned surplus for the old 7% preferred
16 Lonsdale Securities Corp. v. International Mercantile Marine Co., ioi N. J.
Eq. 554, 139 Ati. 5o (Ch. 1927).
07 129 N. J. Eq. 322, 329, i9 A.(2d) 820, 823 (Ch. 1940).
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stock's accrued dividends? 11 The cited cases afford some clues as
to the rationale of the holding, and when these cases are turned to,
the issue is seemingly one of fairness rather than one of corporate
power in the Delaware sense.
This New Jersey doctrine assumed whatever form it takes today
principally in the years from 1924 to 1927 inclusive. Earlier
manifestations can be found, but they are rather unsatisfactory."
The first of the cases in the highest New Jersey court in the 1924-
1927 period, Day v. United States Cast Iron Pipe & Foundry
Co., 00 now a byword in New Jersey corporation law, strangely
enough involved noncumulative preferred stock. It is most fa-
mous generally as the culmination of a line of decisions which rep-
resent the antithesis of the rule laid down by Mr. Justice Holmes
in Wabash Ry. v. Barclay.' Its relevance here lies first in its
98 As did the federal court in Yoakam v. Providence Biltmore Hotel Co., 34
F.(2d) 533 (D. R. I. 1929).
99 The most important of the earlier cases is Colgate v. United States Leather
Co., 73 N. J. Eq. 72, 67 AtI. 657 (Ch. 19o7), rev'd on other grounds, 75 N. J. Eq.
229, 72 Atl. 126 (19o9). The decision, which is discussed in SEC REP. ON REORGANI-
ZATION COmMTrIEES, PART VII (1938) 551-52, is not entirely relevant here because
it was based to a considerable extent on peculiar language of the corporate charter
and on a now obsolete statute. Moreover, the consolidation was viewed as tanta-
mount to a dissolution of the subsidiary, a view since repudiated in New Jersey.
Windhurst v. Central Leather Co., io5 N. J. Eq. 621, 149 Atl. 36 (Ch. 1930), aff'd
per curiam, x07 N. J. Eq. 528, 153 Atl. 402 (1931). For present purposes the value
of the case lies in the Vice Chancellor's reliance on the $7,oooooo earned surplus.
After in effect indicating that the consolidation made it possible for the old common
stock to participate in this surplus to the detriment of the old 8% preferred, he said
(97, 67 Atl. at 667): "The preferred stockholders have on the termination of the
business by the consolidation, the right to an account for at least so much or such
proportion of the apparent surplus as represents net earnings."
The only other early case, Lazear v. American Steel Foundries, 86 N. J. Eq. 21,
252, 98 AtI. 642, ioo Atl. 2o3o (1916), where the Court of Errors and Appeals with
some dissent adopted a Vice Chancellor's opinion as their own, is too anomalous
to be of any use. Compare American Steel Foundries, Inc. v. Lazear, 2o4 Fed. 204
(C. C. A. 3d, 1913).
100 96 N. J. Eq. 736, 126 Atl. 3o2 (1924). This was an affirmance by an equally
divided court of 95 N. J. Eq. 389, 223 AtI. 546 (Ch. 1924).
101 280 U. S. 197 (1930). The other New Jersey cases are Bassett v. United
States Cast Iron Pipe & Foundry Co., 75 N. J. Eq. 539, 73 AUt. 514 (i9o9); Moran
v. United States Cast Iron Pipe & Foundry Co., 95 N. J. Eq. 389, 123 Atl. 546
(Ch. 1924), aff'd, 96 N. J. Eq. 698, 126 Atl. 329 (1924). The Wabash decision is
often viewed as standing for the proposition that once a dividend date of non-
cumulative preferred stock has passed and no dividend declared, the right to that
dividend is gone forever. Actually the holding was somewhat narrower, as careful
reading of Mr. Justice Holmes' opinion will show. A large body of legal literature
1941]
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definition of cumulative prdferred stock as contrasted with non-
cumulative preferred stock:
The dividends upon cumulative preferred stock have at all times and
for all years, past and present, until paid, priority in payment over any
and all unpaid dividends upon common stock, whether the net earnings
for any particular past or present year were or were not sufficient to pay
the stipulated cumulative dividends upon preferred stock for that year;
whereas, the like priority of dividends upon non-cumulative preferred
stock . . .is limited to the unpaid dividends for those years when such
net earnings were sufficient (wholly or in corresponding part) to pay
such dividends -0 2
The Day case has significance secondly by analogy. There a
preferred shareholder, noncumulative indeed, successfully en-
joined the payment in 1923 of a common stock dividend out of
earnings of the year 1922, the 7% annual current dividend on
the preferred for 1922 having been paid in full from 1922 earn-
ings. Yet prior to 1922, in years in which earnings were sufficient
to cover the full 7 % dividend, dividends had not been paid on the
preferred to the extent of $700,000, the withheld earnings being
retained by the corporation as earned surplus.'0 3 While statutory
construction was largely involved, the over-all emphasis in the
opinion was on the idea that this $700,000 of withheld earnings, in
a total earned surplus of some $2,500,000, was earmarked for the
preferred stock, and until it actually was paid, no dividend could
be paid on the common, even from current earnings.0 By anal-
exists with respect to this problem of noncumulative preferred stock. See Berle,
Non-Cumulative Preferred Stock (1923) 23 COL. L. REv. 358; Frey, The Distribu-
tion of Corporate Dividends (1947) 89 U. OF PA. L. REv. 735; Lattin, Is Non-Cumu-
lative Preferred Stock in Fact Preferred (1930) 25 ILL. L. REv. 148. The problem
is still very much alive. Cf., e.g., Lich v. United States Rubber Co., 39 F. Supp. 675
(D. N. J. 1941).
o102 96 N. J. Eq. 736, 74o-4I, 126 AtI. 302, 304-305.
103 The title of the account was "Working Capital Reserve," but it was made
up of surplus profits. See Vice Chancellor Backes' decision below, 95 N. J. Eq. 389,
123 Atl. 546 (Ch. 1924).
104 The main issue in the Day case was whether the noncumulative preferred
stock, in view of the provisions of its contract, came within the class of stock
designated as preferred in § 18 of the New Jersey Corporation Act of 1896. Section
18 at that time provided for the initial creation of preferred stock and stated that
"the holders thereof shall be entitled to receive, and the corporation shall be bound
to pay thereon, a fixed yearly dividend, to be expressed in the certificate, . . . before
any dividend shall be set apart or paid on the common stock, and such dividends
[Vol. 55
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ogy this same principle of withheld earnings can lead to an identi-
cal result in the cumulative preferred stock situation.' More-
over, the analogy can be carried a step further because of the
basic difference between noncumulative and cumulative preferred
stocks. In terms of the excerpt above from the Day case, accrued
dividends on cumulative preferred stock "have at all times and
for all years past and present" priority over the common, and the
presence of earnings sufficient to pay the cumulative dividend in
any given year is irrelevant. If, for example, a corporation had
a slight deficit from operations in one year so that no earnings
whatever were attributable to the preferred stock; if the following
year the net earnings were sufficient not only to erase the deficit but
also to cover the preferred dividend requirements two times, and
nevertheless no dividends were paid, then the withheld earnings
and the resulting earmarked surplus would be an amount equal to
two years' dividend arrearages instead of one, as would be true if
the preferred stock were noncumulative. In other words, where
preferred stock is cumulative the earnings record of a particular
year has no significance. The coexistence of dividend arrearages
and earned surplus establishes the fact of withheld earnings, and
all earned surplus up to the total amount of the accruals is to be
regarded as earmarked for the cumulative preferred stock. Such
a result would seem wholly consonant with the equitable consider-
ations motivating the Day case, and at least not unduly out of line
with the cumulative preferred stock contract.00
may be made cumulative. . . ." Deeming that the legislative policy revealed
the idea of "secured priority," the court held that the particular provisions of the
stock contract did " not authorize the payment to the common stockholders of the
proposed dividend, while earned available and unpaid dividends on the preferred
stock remain undistributed to the preferred stockholders in the corporation's sur-
plus." 96 N. J. Eq. 736, 744, 126 Ati. 302, 306 (1924).
105 That is, if dividends are permitted to accrue in a year in which earnings
were sufficient to pay the preferred dividends, the resulting earned surplus becomes
earmarked for the cumulative preferred stock, at least as against the common stock.
108 On the basis of the cumulative preferred stock contract it can be contended
that as a matter of logic the existence of all earned surplus is immaterial so far
as cumulative preferred stock is concerned. It can be argued that the priority of
the preferred over the common is such that in any adjustment accrued dividends
must be compensated for in full before anything can be given to the common, and
that protection merely to the extent of an existing surplus is not enough. In sub-
stance this seemed to be the view in Delaware of the Keller case until the later cases
demonstrated the narrow application of that decision. This point may become
1941]
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The relevance of and the effect to be given to the existence of
an earned surplus in an accrued dividend adjustment was the
vital issue in a second decision of the New Jersey Court of Errors
and Appeals in the year after -the Day case. In General Invest-
ment Co. v. American Hide & Leather Co.," 7 the corporation had
been formed in 1899 and had some 125,000 shares of 7% cumu-
lative preferred stock outstanding, upon which there were accrued
dividends of $140 per share. To adjust these arrears a recapital-
ization plan was proposed by which a new class of 8% prior pre-
ferred stock was created, into which 35,000 shares of the old 7%
preferred were to be exchanged share for share. The plan further
provided for the purchase and retirement of 30,000 additional old
7 %o preferred shares. Adoption of the plan was voted by three-
fourths of the old 7% preferred and seven-tenths of the old com-
mon. A preferred shareholder sought to enjoin the plan.
In denying an injunction, the court, in an opinion in which nine
of the twelve justices agreed, held first that the 1896 Act empow-
ered the corporation to create a new class of preferred shares with
rights superior to the old 7%o preferred. It then went on, however,
to state that if the purchase of part of the old preferred shares for
retirement involved the use of any of the earned surplus of $5,00o,-
000,108 then the complainant was entitled to an injunction against
use of an amount of the surplus in proportion to the number of his
shares, since such surplus was in effect earmarked for accrued
dividends."" Since the adjustment plan before the court did not
clearer if one remembers that the existence of a surplus is relevant where non-
cumulative preferred is involved because where there have been past earnings and
yet dividends have been withheld, the very existence of that surplus containing
withheld earnings gives rise to a right to it, at least as against the common stock.
But in the case of cumulative preferred, the right to dividends arises wholly with-
out relation to past earnings or past withholding of dividends. It is this absence
of strict logic, in part, which leads one to denominate the New Jersey doctrine as
a rule of fairness.
107 98 N. J. Eq. 326, 129 At. 244 (1925), affirning 97 N. J. Eq. 214, 230, 127
Ati. 529, 6g9 (Ch. 1925).
108 In none of the three opinions in the case is it definitely stated that the sur-
plus involved was earned. Its nature, however, could hardly have been otherwise.
An analysis of the financial statements of the corporation, as contained in Moody's
Manuals, covering the period from the date of its organization in I899 up to 1925,
warrants the inference that the entire $5,000,000 was earned surplus and establishes
very clearly that at least the great bulk of the $5,0oo,0oo was earned surplus.
309 This issue was really academic since the plan called for the purchase of
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have the effect of reducing the earned surplus in any other way,
the majority was free to postpone passing on such questions as the
legality of a dividend on the new 8% prior preferred from the
$5,ooo,ooo earned surplus until such a dividend was actually de-
clared. To a limited degree then, it can be argued that the major-
ity of the court recognized that the right to accrued dividends
should be protected, and be protected generally in the existing
surplus rather than be preserved merely as against the common
stock.
One judge, however, went on to write a concurring opinion which
throws a little light on this particular problem. He agreed that
the basic power existed to create a new preferred stock prior to
the old preferred both "as to future dividends on the old pre-
ferred stock, and also as to priority of payment of principal upon
dissolution. . . ." "' As to the accrued but unpaid dividends,
however, he had more difficulty, and he posed this query:
Is that sufficient to authorize the corporation to destroy the cumula-
tive portion of the contract held by preferred stockholders in a retro-
active way, so that not only is that cumulative provision modified as to
the future (which is a risk which all investors in preferred stock not se-
cured by express contractual provision undertake when they buy such
preferred stock), but as to the past also? Can the rights of preferred
stockholders to receive compensation according to their contract, even
though at some future time, for the period during which their money
has already remained invested on the faith of that contract, be abso-
lutely wiped out and destroyed? i
He then went on to cite Morris v. American Public Utilities Co." 2
and to hold, contrary to that case, that the complainants had a
"vested present property right to have those dividends paid to
them at some future time out of earnings of the corporation before
shares for retirement at par ($xoo) or less, and the price contemplated was ;7o.
Under the New Jersey statutes such a purchase could be made from capital. As
a result, the reduction would be in the capital allocated to the old 7% preferred and
not in the surplus account. If anything, a capital or retirement surplus would be
created by the purchase. This aspect of the transaction was recognized by the con-
curring judge. See 98 N. J. Eq. 326, 334, 129 Atl. 244, 247. Unfairness in another
sense was avoided by the majority's requirement that the shares should be pur-
chased for retirement ratably from each shareholder who desired to sell.
110 98 N. J. Eq. at 338, 129 Ati. at 249.
111 Id. at 339, 129 Atl. at 249.
112 Supra pp. 82-84.
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the payment of any dividends which did not have priority over
them at the time they from time to time matured." "I. He con-
cluded with the statement that the new prior preferred was su-
perior to the existing preferred as to future accruing dividends, but
that no dividends whatever, whether from past surplus or future
earnings, could be paid on the new prior preferred until the accrued
dividends on the existing preferred had been satisfied. In support
of this proposition the Day case was cited. Thus he felt that the
right to accrued dividends was against the corporation generally,
and not merely against the common stock.
The ambiguities and inaccuracies in this concurring opinion
should be noted, as well as the fact that it covers vital points upon
which the majority opinion was silent, and which were not neces-
sarily before the court. In the first place, the Delaware case of
Morris v. American Public Utilities Co. did not hold that accrued
dividends had to be paid on the old preferred before any dividends
could be paid on new prior preferred stock. The Delaware Chan-
cellor made it very clear that whatever right the old preferred stock
had was only in relation to the common stock.'14 The view ex-
pressed in the concurring opinion in the New Jersey case, making
the right to accrued dividends superior to current dividends from
current earnings on new prior preferred stock, is not dealt with
in the majority opinion." 5 Secondly, the concurring opinion
fails to outline the amount of accrued dividends which were to be
regarded as a vested right of the old preferred stock. Were the
complainants entitled to a vested right for an amount in proportion
to the arrearages on their own shares on the basis of $17,500,000,
the total arrears, or, following the analogy of the Day case, on the
basis of the existing earned surplus of $5,000,000? The broad
language of the concurring judge could be construed to mean the
former." 6 But that very language follows a discussion of the
113 98 N. J. Eq. at 340, 129 AtI. at 250.
114 See Note (1938) 12 U. or CiN. L. REv. 576, 587.
115 The majority's protection of the right to accrued dividends in the existing
surplus was against diversion of that surplus to the purchase of old preferred shares
for retirement. No reference was made, as in the concurring opinion, to the possi-
bility of future dividends from that surplus or from future earnings on the new
prior preferred stock. See also discussion of the Yoakam case and Johnson v.
Fuller, note 41 supra.
116 This is the view taken in Note (1938) 12 U. or CIw. L. Rav. 576, 588, which
stresses the statement that the right of the preferred shareholders was to have their
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$5,000,000 surplus and, moreover, the very citation of the Day
case indicates the right is vested only to the extent surplus exists.
Viewing the majority and concurring opinions as a whole, it can
be argued that the vested right of which they speak is in the exist-
ing surplus at the time of the adjustment and extends no further.
Such an interpretation is especially defensible when it is recalled
that we are concerned with considerations of fairness and not with
strictly logical rules. 1
The two cases above complete the authority of the New Jersey
Court of Errors and Appeals in the 1924-1927 period. Several
opinions of the chancery court, however, are of some help. In
Lonsdale Securities Corp. v. International Mercantile Marine
Co.,. 8 decided in 1927, a corporation organized in 1902 sought
to recapitalize. It had over 5oo,ooo shares of 6% $ioo par cumu-
lative preferred stock, on which arrearages amounted to $70 per
share, and slightly less than 500,000 shares of common stock. The
plan resorted to the direct charter amendment method, apparently
on the theory that the 1921 statutory amendment permitted pre-
ferred stock to be reclassified into common stock."9 Under the
plan the two existing classes of shares were to be replaced by 120,-
ooo shares of new 6% no par cumulative preferred and 720,000
shares of no par common stock. Every five shares of old preferred
and accrued dividends were to be exchanged for one share of new
preferred and five shares of new common, and each share of old
common was to be exchanged for one-fifth share of new common.
At the date of the plan there was an earned surplus of over $17,-
ooo,ooo. Once again a preferred shareholder sought to enjoin the
plan.
accrued dividends "paid to them at some future time out of the earnings of the
corporation before the payment of any dividends which did not have priority over
them at the time they from time to time matured." This may be so general, how-
ever, as to be meaningless on this precise point. Other factors tending toward the
view that the total arrears were entitled to priority are the concurring judge's ap-
parent feeling that, despite the book surplus, the surplus had not been " ascertained
to be available for dividends," and the manner in which he contrasted the modifi-
cation of the cumulative provision as to the future with modification as to the past
so as to find a difference, in which the existence of a surplus played no part. See
98 N. J. Eq. at 339-40, 129 At. at 249-50.
117 Compare note io6 supra for the strictly logical view. Note (1938) 12 U. oF
CmN. L. R v. 576 also exemplifies the purely legalistic point of view.
118 Ioi N. J. Eq. 554, 139 At. 5o (Ch. 1927).
119 Cf. Sander v. Janssen Dairy Corp., 36 F. Supp. 512 (D. N. J. 1940).
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In granting the injunction the Vice Chancellor expressly avoided
as unnecessary the possible ground that since the corporation had
been organized prior to the 1921 statute, the reserve power of the
state was inadequate to confer power to make the amendment for
constitutional reasons.' Instead, assuming the existence of such
corporate power, he held the plan illegal because it disturbed the
old preferred stock's vested right in the $17,000,ooo surplus. He
said that the preferred shareholders:
* . . have become vested with rights as against the holders of the
common shares in a surplus of at least some $17,000,000 that the com-
pany has accumulated and also in future earnings and all the other prop-
erty of the corporation.'
The first part of this quotation is very clear, for under the facts of
the case it was possible for the common stock to come in and share
in the existing surplus.'22 But the cryptic reference to " future
earnings " raises the same cloud of ambiguity as in the concurring
opinion in General Investment Co. v. American Hide & Leather
Co. Later in the opinion, however, the Vice Chancellor reverts
again to the earned surplus and makes it appear that the accrued
dividends were not vested beyond the amount of that surplus:
At the present time the holders of the existing preferred stock would
be entitled to all of the existing surplus if the directors should decide
to declare a dividend. If that stock is retired in accordance with the
proposed plan, then it is readily seen that the requirements of the rela-
tively few shares of no-par-value preferred stock (the new stock) might
be satisfied out of a portion of the surplus, and the balance thereof de-
voted to a payment on the no-par-value common stock which would in
part represent and stand in the place of the present common stock. This
would be an indirect means of accomplishing a result that is now beyond
the powers of the corporation.
23
120 See note 87 supra.
121 ioI N. J. Eq. at 558, 139 At]. at 51.
122 After the amendment the annual dividend requirements on the new pre-
ferred would have been $720,000. If any common dividend had also been declared
a portion would have gone to the old common whose old shares had been converted
into new at the ratio of one-fifth new for one old. Such a common dividend could
have been charged to the preexisting surplus. This did not occur in General Invest-
nent Co. v. American Hide & Leather Co., where the possibility was one of the
surplus being used for the benefit of old preferred shareholders who made the
exchange. 123 ioi N. J. Eq. at 56o, x39 AtI. at 52.
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Both the foregoing New Jersey cases involved corporations
which had earned surpluses at the time the adjustment was pro-
posed. To test whether the right to accrued dividends is vested
to the full amount of the arrearages or only to the extent there is
such a surplus, one need only find cases where deficits existed.
Unfortunately such cases seem to be very rare and the best au-
thority is one where the question of laches played a significant
role in the decision. Yet this case does shed some light on the
problem and tends to bear out the conclusion that the right is
vested only in so far as there is earned surplus.
In Windhurst v. Central Leather Co.,'24 the Vice Chancellor,
who incidentally also rendered the decision in the Lonsdale case 25
and the chancery court decision in the General Investment Co.
case,126 rendered two opinions: one denying an injunction against
the plan and the other refusing specific performance. The pro-
posal was one of consolidation whereby a new company was to
be formed. The one constituent company had a 7% cumulative
preferred stock with arrears of approximately $43 per share, and
common stock. It had a capital deficit of more than $19,oo,0oo.
Under the plan the new company was to have three classes of
shares: (i) 7% cumulative prior preference stock; (2) Class A
participating convertible stock, no par, entitled to a $4 dividend
before the common, but after the prior preference stock, and to an
additional dividend not to exceed $2 equal to whatever might be
paid on the common stock; and (3) common stock. Each old pre-
ferred share and accrued dividends was to be exchanged for one-
half share of new prior preference stock, three-fourths of a share
of Class A stock, and $5 in cash. Over 9o of the old preferred
stock voted in favor of the plan.
Despite the Vice Chancellor's reliance on laches in both Wind-
hurst decisions, the two opinions show clearly that the absence of
surplus was a vital factor. First, the plan was expressly found to
be fair and equitable, emphasis being placed on the fact that the
old preferred, by virtue of their new prior preference and Class A
shares, would receive $6.5o in any year before the common stock
124 ioi N. J. Eq. 543, 138 Ati. 772 (Ch. 1927), io5 N. J. Eq. 621, 149 At. 36
(Ch. 1930), aff'd per curiam, 107 N. J. Eq. 528, 153 At. 402 (193').
125 Supra pp. io7-1o8.
126 General Investment Co. v. American Hide & Leather Co., 97 N. J. Eq. 214,
127 AtI. 529 (Ch. 1925).
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would be entitled to any dividend. The Vice Chancellor implied,
moreover, that even had the complainant's application for relief
been timely, it would have been denied since the plan was fair and
equitable. Secondly, he specifically referred to the surplus of
$17,000,000 which existed in Lonsdale Securities Corp. v. Inter-
national Mercantile Marine Corp.,'27 and drew a distinction:
There was a surplus of some $17,000,000 in which I felt the preferred
shareholders had secured rights which could not be diminished or de-
stroyed in the case of any one of them without his consent. No such
situation appears in the case at bar. Upon the other hand the proofs
disclose that there is a deficit of almost $20,000,000 which will continue
to mount, year by year, unless some such corporate step should be al-
lowed as the one these complainants wish to defeat. 28
Any summary of the doctrine developed in the foregoing New
Jersey cases is necessarily open to contradiction at various points.
Such a summary must be undertaken, however, for the sake of
clarification. First and most important, their approach to accrued
dividend adjustments is that of equity seeking to formulate a rule
of fairness. By assuming the existence of corporate power, they
commence where the Delaware cases leave off, and at least at-
tempt, perhaps in a fumbling fashion, to set up some workable
standard by which this fairness can be ascertained.
The starting point in this endeavor is the existence of an earned
surplus at the date of the accrued dividend adjustment. As long
as.this surplus is made up of earnings, it does not matter when it
came into being. It may have arisen from the direct withholding
of preferred dividends, from surplus profits over and above pre-
ferred dividend requirements in years prior to the existence of
any accruals,'29 or from any other source. Given such an earned
127 Supra pp. 107-IO8.
128 ios N. J. Eq. at 625, 149 AtI. at 38.
129 In Johnson v. Fuller, 36 F. Supp. 744 (E. D. Pa. r94o), aff'd, 12i F.(2d) 618
(C. C. A. 3d, 1941), involving an indirect adjustment by a Pennsylvania corpora-
tion, there was an earned surplus of $20,000,000 which had been built up prior to
1933, up to which time preferred dividends had been regularly paid. From 1933
through 1939 the corporation paid out more in preferred dividends than had been
earned on the preferred stock during the same period. The idea of the district
court that these facts gave the old preferred no claim on the earned surplus would
seem to be erroneous and indicates possible confusion of cumulative with non-
cumulative preferred stock. In note 95 supra, it is pointed out that the same situ-
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surplus available for payment of dividends, the New Jersey courts
deem any adjustment plan unfair and inequitable which makes
available to the common stock any part of any objecting preferred
shareholder's proportionate share of that surplus. An adjustment
plan proceeding on the direct charter amendment or merger method
is especially likely to have this consequence, because often the pre-
ferred stock plus arrearages is wholly or partly converted into
common stock. In effect this means that an adjustment plan
must provide for accrued dividends of objecting shareholders to
the extent of available earned surplus in cash or its equivalent,
and provision in stock will be deemed insufficient.130 Since the
relief granted is usually invalidation of the adjustment, no prob-
lem arises as to payment of dividends on new stocks from future
earnings.
Where an adjustment plan does not have the effect of opening up
an existing earned surplus to the common stock, as in the typical
indirect charter amendment adjustment, the New Jersey doctrine
is not so clear. Where a new prior preferred stock is created into
which the old preferred and arrears may be converted - and every
New Jersey case agrees such a prior preferred can be legally cre-
ated -the cases tend to indicate that the old preferred share-
holders still possess some rights in an existing earned surplus even
as against the new prior preferred stock. 31 If this is valid, sev-
eral possibilities for fair and equitable relief exist. The most
complete relief would be afforded by enjoining the payment of
any dividend whatever on the new prior preferred stock, whether
the source be past earned surplus or earnings arising after the
creation of the new stock, until payment of the accrued dividends
on the old preferred stock. That such sweeping protection of the
right to accrued dividends is appropriate was indicated in the con-
curring opinion in General Investment Co. v. American Hide &
Leather Co. 132 and is implicit in the recent holding in Buckley v.
ation existed in Buckley v. Cuban American Sugar Co., 129 N. J. Eq. 322, i9 A.(2d)
820 (Ch. i94o).
130 This article is the exposition of a theory, and in future cases other factors
may alter the picture. If, for example, the provision in stock were clearly equal to
the value of the arrearages, or if the corporation were organized after 1926, when the
provision for funding arrearages was enacted, a basis for a different result would
be afforded.
131 The validity of this view is vigorously attacked in Note (1938) 12 U. oF
Cn. L. PEv. 576, 590-93, 598. 132 Supra p. 25.
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Cuban American Sugar Co.' These two cases, however, are
hardly decisive of the point, and countervailing policy considera-
tions, such as the undesirability of virtually blocking all adjust-
ment plans, suggest that a more moderate form of relief would be
more justifiable. Relief wholly consistent with the earned surplus
principle, and with the accepted idea that changes as to the future
are less momentous than changes as to the past, would be to re-
strain payment of any dividend from earned surplus existing as of
the date of the adjustment until all accrued dividends on the
objecting non-converting shares have been paid." 4 Future earn-
ings would thus be left as an available source for dividends on the
new prior preferred stock." 5 This much protection for accrued
dividends would seem to be supportable under the New Jersey
doctrine of fairness, but is open to serious doubts on practical
grounds. And even here the evidence is far from conclusive, and
final determination still lies in the future.
On logical grounds of contract interpretation, of course, there
is some difficulty in drawing a line between the situation where
there is an earned surplus and that where there is a deficit, for in
both the character of the right to accrued dividends seems pre-
cisely the same. Yet as a practical matter the existence of an
earned surplus gives the right to accrued dividends a tangible qual-
ity, a something in which the right may be said to vest. Moreover,
where earnings have been withheld and arrears are nevertheless
about to be adjusted, the atmosphere is considerably more one
where an injustice, seeming or otherwise, is about to be perpe-
trated. Whatever the explanation, the fact remains that the New
Jersey courts, by indirection perhaps, have at least taken one step
toward giving the rights of the preferred shareholder a quality of
concreteness and definiteness which appears to be entirely lacking
in Delaware since the retreat from the Keller case.
John F. Meck, Jr.
WASHINGTON, D. C.
133 Supra pp. 99-io1.
134 The restraining order could extend to the entire past earned surplus if neces-
sary, but more properly should affect only a part thereof, proportionate to the
holdings of the objecting preferred shareholders.
135 This type of relief was granted in Yoakam v. Providence Biltmore Hotel Co?,
34 F.(2d) 533 (D. R. I. X929).
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